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Abstract
In recent years, anti-Zionism and anti-Israel rhetoric have become hallmarks of the American Left.
Moreover, many on the Left have downplayed or denied the severity of antisemitism. This paper seeks
to determine how widespread overt and latent antisemitism are among the Left. More speci cally, it
seeks to determine if there is a double standard applied to antisemitism that could be indicative of
latent antisemitism as well as if the anti-Zionist rhetoric is the result of latent antisemitism. To do so,
respondents in a nationally-representative survey were given questions designed to determine overt
antisemitism, as well as two di erent experiments designed to elicit latent antisemitism. The results
showed that latent antisemitism does not appear for any of the ideological groups on the Left in the
context of  ghting discrimination. However, it does appear among Liberals as it relates to
self-determination and Progressives when Israel is mentioned. These  ndings help illuminate how the
Left views antisemitism, the relationship between anti-Zionism and the Left, as well as how widespread
latent and overt antisemitism are among the Left.
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Introduction
Where the Right  ghts for freedom and liberty, the Left  ghts for equality and egalitarianism.
The Left has been actively involved in feminism, anti-racism, and the  ght for LGBTQ rights and
equality. Although each movement comes and goes in intensity and scope with the current focus on
anti-racism, the Left readily calls out sexism, homophobia/transphobia, racism, and other forms of
prejudice when they appear. Yet, despite the rise in violent antisemitism in recent years, it has rarely
received the same sort of attention that other forms of hatred and bigotry receive. In fact, the Left
regularly ignores, denies, downplays the severity of, or derails the conversations surrounding
antisemitism (CITE). In this article, I will be looking at both explicit and latent antisemitism among
the American Left, speci cally among progressives and liberals. To assess this, I will draw on data from
a survey conducted in October 2020. Using two di erent experiments, I will analyze how people view
Jewish vs non-Jewish people. I will then show whether or not the results of the experiments indicate
the existence of latent antisemitism.
I will begin by looking at past literature on Jews, antisemitism, and the Left. First, I will look at
the results of other survey data and see what that tells us about how people view Jews and
antisemitism. Then, I will look at previous studies that have attempted to explain the existence of
antisemitism and how certain factors may contribute towards antisemitism. Afterwards, I will give an
overview of the relationship between antisemitism and the American left. Lastly, I will look at the
relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism.
Perceptions of  Antisemitism and Jews
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Antisemitism is widely referred to as the world’s oldest form of hatred and not without good
reason. Having existed for thousands of years, antisemitism is constantly changing and evolving to new
and di erent times. Moreover, antisemitism has peaks and valleys in intensity. Despite this, when
compared to other forms of hatred, antisemitism is regularly thought of as a less serious or urgent
problem. Despite a 22% increase from 2016, Americans still view women (69%), gays and lesbians
(75%), Hispanics (76%), blacks (80%), and Muslims (82%) as experiencing more discrimination than
Jews (64%) according to a Pew Research survey from 2019 (Pew Research 2019). This jump was likely
driven by the plethora of recent antisemitic attacks, headlined by the attack on the Tree of Life
synagogue in Pittsburgh in 2018, as well as the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville in 2017.
Perhaps when most people think of antisemitism they only imagine extreme antisemitism, like the
Nazis. As a result, many people may be unable to recognize antisemitism when it does not appear as
violence.
Americans’ blindspot for antisemitism and discrimination against Jews a ects how seriously
they perceive antisemitism. This is particularly evident when comparing Jewish Americans’ views of
antisemitism to those of the general public. In 2000, when asked how serious of a problem
antisemitism was, 95% of Jews said it was a problem and only 63% of the general public said it was a
problem (Shapiro and Smith 2019). In 2003 it was 97% and 57%, respectively (Shapiro and Smith
2019). And 2005 was much the same with 92% and 67%, respectively (Shapiro and Smith 2019). This
pattern persists to this day, where 88% of Jews say antisemitism is a problem compared to 62% of the
general public (American Jewish Committee 2020).
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Despite these views of antisemitism, most Americans view Jews in a positive light. In 2019,
Americans viewed Jews as warmly as they did whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and
Christians, with each group receiving an average warmth rating between 77% and 79%
(Anti-Defamation League 2020). But, when compared to gays and lesbians, Muslims, or transgender
people, Jews were perceived in a much warmer light as each of these groups received warmth ratings of
67%, 64% and 62% respectively (Anti-Defamation League 2020). Despite this surface-level warmth,
there has been a steady portion of the population that harbors deep antisemitism. From 2005 through
2019 the number of people who were considered to have deeply engrained antisemitic beliefs (agree
with six or more of the eleven antisemitic tropes) ranged anywhere from eleven to  fteen percent
(Shapiro and Smith 2019).
These types of cross-sectional questions are frequently the only questions used when
measuring antisemitism among large survey samples. Unfortunately, these questions are unable to
determine if latent antisemitism exists, which is de ned as “prejudicial attitudes and hatreds are not
being actively expressed and consciously thought but persist in a dormant state open to reactivation”
(Shapiro and Smith 2019). In other words, these studies likely do not demonstrate how widespread
antisemitism actually. One possible explanation for this is that people are less likely to answer questions
that are considered o ensive even if they believe in them because they have a desire for inclusion. So,
rather than saying how they actually feel, people just say what they believe is socially acceptable.
Unfortunately, here are few studies that have used any of the scienti c methods that are capable of
uncovering implicit biases and latent antisemitic sentiment (Shapiro and Smith 2019).
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Nevertheless, there are still various methods of uncovering implicit biases and latent
antisemitism. One method for uncovering latent antisemitism is through the use of experiments. One
such study was done by Mendelberg and Berinsky (2005) which found that there is no discernible
di erence in support for a candidate with regard to whether or not their Jewishishness was mentioned.
However, when this was paired with a typical social stereotype, such as Jews being shady, there was a
signi cant negative impact on support for the candidate. The authors concluded by saying “that when
campaigns cue stereotypic social traits–even those widely discredited–they may prompt indirectly a
process of stereotyping by which Jewish candidates could lose political support” (Mendelberg and
Berinsky 2005).
Another method is through the use of a list experiment. This was employed by Kane et al.
(2004, 285) to measure the the “degree to which anti-Jewish views may have been activated by the
nomination of Joseph Lieberman as a candidate for vice president of the United States, or by the
prospect of a future Jewish presidential candidate.” They chose the list experiment given its ability to
remove the e ects of social desirability bias regarding race. What they ended up  nding was that Joseph
Lieberman’s nomination for vice president did not conjure up a lot of anti-Jewish views and a
potential future Jewish presidential candidate conjured up a little bit more anti-Jewish sentiment.
However, they acknowledge that a list experiment may not measure anti-Jewish sentiment as well as
anti-Black sentiment given the fact that it measures anger and not other negative feelings, like unease or
concern (Kane et al. 2004, 292).
While there are other methods of determining implicit bias and latent antisemitism, such as the
Implicit Association Test/A ect Misattribution Procedure (Cunningham et al. 2004; Imho  and
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Banse 2009; Rudman et al. 2009), “matched pair testing”, “correspondence testing”, and the bogus
pipeline approach, none of them have been used in large-scale surveys. As a result, the literature on
latent antisemitism is quite limited. Nevertheless, there have been some studies conducted that seek to
explain di erent aspects of antisemitism. In the next section I will look at a few studies that use a
variety of methods to study various aspects of antisemitism.
Explanations of  Antisemitism
In order to analyze antisemitism, it is important to understand what causes it. There have been
various studies conducted that have shown that things like competitive victimhood, political
uncontrollability, Social Dominance Orientation, and Right Wing Authoritarianism actively
contribute to antisemitism. One explanation attempts to understand why people believe in antisemitic
conspiracy theories by looking at political uncontrollability and political uncertainty. Political
uncontrollability “means that a person feels like a pawn and experiences an enduring loss of personal
in uence over the political world” (Kofta et al. 2020, 901). While political uncertainty means “that a
person feels that the political world is void of structure and order, and this feeling is accompanied by a
lack of certainty about the course of political events and the inability to predict what will happen”
(Kofta et al. 2020, 901). It turns out that political uncontrollability, not uncertainty, is directly related
to an increase in belief in antisemitic conspiracy theories (Kofta et al. 2020). The study also found that
when people feel a lack of personal control, such as a lack of control over events in their personal life,
support for conspiracy theories also increases. Furthermore, the authors claim that their studies show
that “Jews are probably the most likely to be construed as a conspiring group” when compared to
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things like the government, the Illuminati, global companies, etc. (Kofta et al. 2020, 915). While it is
not exactly clear the reasoning behind this, it is likely driven by the success that Jews have had across the
world. This success led to the belief that Jews are not some tiny, weak minority, but rather a very strong
group capable of competing with the majority.
A few explanations have looked at personality traits. One such trait is Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) which is part of Social Dominance Theory (SDT). SDT is the belief that society is
composed of distinct groups that are organized in a hierarchy according to privilege and social power
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999). SDO is the personality trait that believes that some groups are superior to
others, has been shown to be closely correlated with anti-black racism, nationalism, and other
hierarchy legitimizing myths (Pratto et al. 1994). This would lead one to expect that SDO would also
be closely related to antisemitism. However, when tested in Germany, SDO was found to not be
correlated strongly with manifest antisemitism or latent antisemitism (Frindte et al. 2005).
Unfortunately, there have not been many other experiments outside of Germany to determine if this is
consistent across societies or if it is unique to Germany.
A di erent personality trait that has been shown to predict antisemitism is Right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA). RWA is de ned as “an individual di erence variable, a personality trait if you
like, developed on the premise that some people need little situational pressure to (say) submit to
authority and attack others, while others require signi cantly more” (Altemeyer 1996, 8). One study,
conducted in Germany, found that RWA was closely correlated with manifest antisemitism, latent
antisemitism, and anti-Israel attitudes (Frindte et al. 2005). Another study conducted in the Czech
Republic and US, analyzed how RWA and Gough’s Prejudice and Tolerance (Pr/To) scale were related
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to antisemitism (Dunbar and Simonova 2003). While both RWA and Pr/To both “evidenced a modest
correlation” with antisemitism, “higher scores for RWA yielded signi cantly stronger anti-Semitic
attitudes, irrespective of classi cation on Pr/To” (Dunbar and Simonova 2003, 517-519). However,
another study that analyzed the relationship between support for authoritarianism (more generally)
and antisemitism did not  nd a strong correlation (Raden 1999).
Another factor that contributes towards antisemitism is the idea of victimhood. A study
containing multiple survey experiments and a natural experiment conducted in Greece found that
“perceptions of collective su ering, especially when triggered by comparisons with groups whose
victimhood appears to be undisputed, triggers hostile attitudes towards the Jews” (Antoniou et al.
2020, 876). In other words, antisemitism is triggered when a group feels itself to be a victim, especially
when they are compared to a group whose victimhood is not questioned, in this case Armenians and
Jews. This is caused by two things: (1) an increase in in-group favoritism; and (2) competition over the
magnitude and intensity of su ering that can lead to the relegation of others’ victimhood (Antoniou et
al. 2020, 876).
An Overview: Antisemitism on the Left
While all of these previous studies are bene cial and further our understanding of the causes of
antisemitism, they each have a few shortcomings. First, many of them contain very small sample sizes
which puts into question the results of the survey. Second, while many of these studies examine latent
antisemitism, they do not also measure overt antisemitism to see if that is driving the results or if it is
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actually latent antisemitism. Third, these studies do not separate people by ideology or partisanship so
we do not know if these results are consistent regardless of ideology.
Before getting into antisemitism among the Left, I should probably de ne what I mean when I
refer to “the Left.” I am not referring to far left groups, like socialists, communists, anarchists, etc., but
rather to more mainstream left-leaning people like progressives and liberals. I should note that some of
these progressives and liberals may identify themselves also as socialists, communists, or anarchists, but
their primary identity is progressive and/or liberal. This di ers from many studies in the past which use
the liberal-conservative continuum because of its ability to convey a lot of information (Converse).
Unfortunately, this scale fails to show intraparty con ict, such as the di erences among progressives
and liberals.
One of the biggest issues with antisemitism and the Left is the way the two interact. First,
when antisemitism occurs, it is rare for the Left to acknowledge it. However, when the Left does
recognize it, it usually occurs for a few reasons. They are more likely to acknowledge it when
antisemitism is present with some other form of hatred or bigotry, like racism. However, when this
happens, the Left often focuses on the other hatred and only gives a passing reference to antisemitism.
This is particularly evident after the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville where white supremacists
wore Nazi symbols, carried Nazi  ags, and chanted “Jews will not replace us” and “blood and soil” – a
slogan used by Nazi Germany (Green 2017). In an article published in Vox, a website regarded by many
media bias checkers as left-leaning (AllSides, Media Bias Fact Check, Ad Fontes Media). Dara Lind
mentions the “Nazi cation of the alt-right” and yet fails to mention antisemitism once. Instead, she
references the racism of the event and the fact that “racist rhetoric has become a hallmark of the
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alt-right” (Lind 2017). Rather than discussing the overwhelming amount of antisemitism present at
the rally, Lind chose instead to focus on a di erent form of hatred and bigotry – racism.
The other time that the Left recognizes antisemitism is when it is extremely violent and
conducted by the right, like the attack in Pittsburgh at the Tree of Life Synagogue. Beyond simply
reporting the attack, several articles discussed the antisemitic nature of the attack. Moreover, they often
refer to a “rise” or “resurgence” of antisemitism. For example, Alexandra Schwartz, from the New
Yorker, titled one of her pieces “The Tree of Life Shooting and the Return of Anti-Semitism to
American Life” (Schwartz 2018). Similarly, Steve Rosenberg wrote, “While anti-Semitism had been on
the rise for the past few years, the Tree of Life tragedy was in some ways a catalyst for the hate and
terror still to come, such as the violent acts in Poway and Jersey City” (Rosenberg 2020). This sort of
messaging is misleading as to what antisemitism is and how prevalent it has been, as well as reinforces
the idea that “real antisemitism” is limited to violence and deadly attacks on Jews.
Reporting also often implies that antisemitism only comes from the Right. By referring to a
rise of antisemitism when violent antisemitism appears, people are implicitly suggesting that
antisemitism is only violent action, and since that is usually perpetrated by the Right, the Left is
somehow immune to antisemitism. As a result, many on the Left continue to refuse to acknowledge
that antisemitism occurs on both the Left and Right. As one person in the popular left-wing magazine
Jacobin argued, “the best way to  ght [antisemitism] is to reject the centrist idea that antisemitism
transcends politics” (Magarik 2020). The author concludes by saying that “only the Left can defeat
antisemitism, because only the Left can name enemies: white supremacy, the police state, a radically
unequal society sustained in part by the cynical redirection of popular rage against Jews” (Magarik
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2020). In other words, the only proponents of antisemitism are white supremacists, the police state,
and an unequal society. Put more simply, any antisemitism that comes from the Left is actually a result
of the actions by the Right.
Although violent antisemitism may receive coverage, antisemitic comments and rhetoric rarely
do. This was particularly relevant over the summer of 2020 at the height of Black Lives Matter
movement when several celebrities posted antisemitic messages on social media blaming Jews for the
oppression of Blacks. DeSean Jackson, a professional football player, posted a picture of quotes
attributed to Hitler that referred to the oppression of Blacks because of the Jews (Neubeck 2020).
Stephen Jackson, a former professional basketball player, while live on Instagram, said that Jews
weren’t doing enough to help  ght racism and that they control the banks and thus keep Black people
oppressed (Bieler 2020). Ice Cube, a famous rapper and actor, posted a variety of antisemitic tweets
and conspiracy theories alleging that the Jews controlled the world and were the ones keeping Blacks
oppressed (Greenspan 2020).
Since Drew Brees received immediate and intense backlash due to his comments criticizing
those who kneel during the national anthem, some expected there to be more outrage over the
antisemitic comments posted (Triplett 2020). Kareem Abdul Jabbar put it succinctly when he said,
“Given the New Woke-fulness in Hollywood and the sports world, we expected more passionate public
outrage. What we got was a shrug of meh-rage” (Abdul-Jabbar 2020). The disparity in the response to
DeSean Jackson, Stephen Jackson, and Ice Cube compared to Drew Brees and others demonstrates the
double standard that some on the Left have towards antisemitism. Despite the fact that DeSean
Jackson, Stephen Jackson, and Ice Cube were posting blatantly antisemitic sentiment to their millions
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of followers, many on the Left chose to ignore it because the intent behind their messages was to uplift
the Black community and  ght Black oppression. To many on the Left, this intent is apparently more
important than the blatant antisemitism of their messages.
One of the main reasons for why antisemitism is regularly ignored by the Left is because it is
regarded as the “loud complaints of an extremely privileged group over mild annoyances” (Sunshine
2019, 4). Noam Chomsky once said, “Anti-Semitism is no longer a problem, fortunately. It's raised,
but it's raised because privileged people want to make sure they have total control, not just 98%
control” (Chomsky, n.d.). In other words, antisemitism is no longer a problem because Jews are a
“privileged people” and privileged peoples cannot face oppression. Instead, Chomsky is also pushing
the idea that Jews misuse antisemitism as a cudgel to maintain power.
Others believe that this privilege is a result of the fact that American Jews predominantly
appear white. This has led to the belief that all Jews are white, even though Jews were viewed by others
as non-White for centuries. This has gotten to the point where people have begun labeling
antisemitism as “white on white crime” which is how a student at Oberlin College referred to the
Holocaust (Jacobson 2016). This blatantly ignores the racist rhetoric of the inferiority of Jews that was
central to Nazism and a direct contributor to the Holocaust. Others claim that Jews simply can’t face
oppression because many are white passing and bene t from white privilege. For example, in response
to a tweet by Bari Weiss discussing the antisemitic history of Louis Farrakhan, Dr. Natalie Hopkinson,
an author and associate professor at Howard University’s Department of Communication, Culture
and Media Studies, tweeted that “ppl who have become white should not be lecturing Black ppl about
oppression” (@NatHopkinson, October 18, 2020). In other words, Jews cannot talk about oppression
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because their apparent whiteness prevents them from experiencing oppression. Not only does this
ignore the existence of Jewish people of color and their experiences, but it also ignores the historical
persecution and oppression of Jews on the basis that they are not considered white.
Similar to ignoring antisemitism, many on the Left choose to actively downplay antisemitism
by claiming that it is not a serious issue (Arnold and Taylor 2019, 11). The di erence between
downplaying and denying antisemitism is that when one ignores antisemitism, they refuse to
acknowledge its existence. On the other hand, when downplaying antisemitism one is acknowledging
its existence but simply saying it is not a problem. For example, Spencer Sunshine (2019, 4) says that
antisemitism is seen by people among the Left as “mild annoyances.” Another example of downplaying
antisemitism is when Noam Chomsky (n.d.) said, “Anti-Semitism is no longer an issue fortunately.” As
one Left political activist said, antisemitism is “mostly a lighthearted thing” (Arnold 2015, 379). Or, as
Michael Neumann called it, “a minor problem, overblown” (Neumann 2002). Each of these examples
acknowledge the existence of antisemitism but claim that it is not something worth  ghting over
because it is not serious and that its severity has been seriously exaggerated.
Given the prevalence of ignoring, downplaying, and derailing antisemitism among the Left, I
would hypothesize that people on the Left would be less supportive of  ghting discrimination when
antisemitism is mentioned. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this is the result of overt antisemitic
sentiment because the following factors pressure people, especially those on the left, not to hold overt
antisemitic sentiment: the US like the relatively low level of overt antisemitism, the prevalence of
right-wing organizations who focus on antisemitism, the prominence of Holocaust commemoration,
and the existence of a thriving Jewish community in the US (Arnold and Taylor 2019, 21-22). From
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this perspective, I would not expect there to be a signi cant relationship between overt antisemitism
and the drop-o  in support for  ghting discrimination when antisemitism is mentioned for people on
the Left. I would speculate that this is driven by the idea that Jews are no longer victims. Among the
groups the Left perceives to experience su ering, Jews are commonly excluded. As such, people are less
likely to support  ghting antisemitism since it is not perceived to be something serious.
Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism
People do not just ignore antisemitism because of the idea that Jews are privileged and that
their complaints are not valid, but also because of what the Left argues is the weaponization, or misuse,
of antisemitism. When asked if antisemitism is a problem in the US today, many left-wing activists
“hardly spent time talking about antisemitism… but instead actively redirected the conversation so as to
talk about the problems with this phenomenon: its supposedly strategic use or ‘misuse’” (Arnold 2015,
379). Much of this so-called “misuse” is related to Israel and to Zionism. As one example, some people
on the Left claim that antisemitism is used to “smear the Left” in order to silence criticism of Israel and
Zionism (Cook 2018, Davidson 2016).
Before I delve into the relationship between anti-Zionism and the Left, I ought to explain what
the majority of Jews believe Zionism is. According to the Anti-Defamation League, “Zionism is the
Jewish national movement of self-determination in the land of Israel — the historical birthplace and
biblical homeland of the Jewish people” (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.). Although Zionism is a term
that contains many di erent interpretations and beliefs, they all are based around the position that
Jews should have the right to self-determination to form their own state in their ancestral homeland of
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Israel. It’s important to note that to many Jews, especially in the US, this does not disqualify the
existence of a Palestinian state at the same time, as evident by the fact that 61% of American Jews
believe that Israel and an independent Palestinian state can peacefully coexist (Pew Research Center
2013).
To some on the Left, Zionism represents something much more sinister. To them, Zionism has
come to symbolize most of what the Left opposes. Writing on behalf of the Progressive Action
Coalition, one person put it, “Zionism… is a nationalistic political ideology which called for the
establishment of a European Jewish-majority state in Palestine in which indigenous Palestinians already
resided” (Mor 2017). Zionism does not represent the pursuit of self-determination for the Jewish
people but rather “a movement by European [settler-colonialists] who wanted to take over someone
else's country and create a settler colony of Europeans” (Massad 2019). Others have claimed that
supporting Zionism means supporting apartheid (Davidson 2021). Still others equate Zionism with
white supremacy (Michael Love 2002). Put simply, we can  nd arguments on the left connecting
Zionism to white supremacy, racism, colonialism, and imperialism.
As a result, being anti-Zionist has become an essential to be part of the Left. In fact, Zionism
and, in turn, anti-Zionism have become more than just a con ict between Israelis and Palestinians, it
has become symbolic of something much larger: “Anti-Zionism is more than a speci c position taken
toward the Middle East con ict; rather, it expresses that one is on the right side of history, thereby
rejecting imperialism, colonialism, racism, and nationalism” (Arnold 2015, 392). It has become so
integral to the Left and the  ght for equality that it “litmus tests people for Jewish issues, even when
the topics at hand have nothing to do with it” (Sunshine 2019, 7). Take for example the International
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Women’s March of 2017, which made the Israeli-Palestinian con ict an essential aspect of the feminist
movement (Shire 2017). When questioned about why including Israel was so essential to the feminist
movement, Linda Sarsour (2017) said:
It just doesn’t make any sense for someone to say, “Is there room for people who support the
state of Israel and do not criticize it in the movement?” There can’t be in feminism. You either
stand up for the rights of all women, including Palestinians, or none. There’s just no way
around it.
This represents a double standard placed on Israel, especially considering the fact that Yemen, Syria,
Iraq, and Afghanistan have some of the worst gender inequality ratings in the world (Georgetown
Institute for Women 2019). This litmus test over one’s support for Zionism overwhelmingly punishes
Jews as over 95% of American Jews support Israel (Newport 2019).
Given the presence of anti-Zionism on the Left and the fact that it appears to be no longer
considered just a political position on the Middle East, I would expect there to be a signi cant drop o 
when people on the Left are questioned about Jewish people’s right to self-determination compared to
all people’s right to self-determination. Moreover, considering the prevalence of anti-Israel rhetoric, I
hypothesize that the support for Jewish people’s right to self-determination among those on the Left
will decrease even more when Israel is mentioned. Alternatively, people on the Left may choose to
oppose this because of their support of pluralism, the idea that a country should be made up of a
diverse population. To this point, it remains unclear if these beliefs are widespread or simply limited to
the “vocal minority.” Therefore, through the use of experiments, I attempt to  gure out how
widespread these beliefs are.
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Data and Design
I draw on data collected from a survey conducted during October of 2020 which received
1,740 responses. The survey used Qualtrics Panels to generate a sample of American adults, applying
quotas for age, gender, and region that match the current Census. To correct for any remaining
imbalances, we generated a weight variable. The data was then  ltered by accuracy (the survey included
several attention questions) and speed (those who took it too quickly were removed).
Measurement – Independent Variables
In order to view antisemitism on the left, I had to  gure out which side of the political
spectrum people were on. Rather than using the traditional scale of very liberal and very conservative, I
gave the respondents a list of di erent ideological labels to choose from: conservative, alt-right,
moderate, liberal, progressive, libertarian, or socialist. I chose to do this because the traditional scale can
obscure the results at the extremes. For example, someone who identi es as alt-right or libertarian
would be forced to say they are very conservative. This would lump them in with someone who
considers themselves to be very conservative and yet doesn’t align themselves with the libertarian or
alt-right ideologies.
Nevertheless, I am more interested in the distinction between liberals and progressives. In
recent years, there has been a surge in people who identify as progressive. Unfortunately, there have not
been many studies done analyzing the di erences among progressives and liberals so there is not yet a
consensus on the di erence. Kevin K. Banda et al. (2016), conducted a study looking at the di erence
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between the two groups and found that the two groups do not di er much in ideology but do have
much more negative views of the other group.
Because some people may identify with more than one ideology, such as being both progressive
and liberal, the respondents were able to select multiple responses. I then grouped all of the responses
into four categories. One category was labeled “Liberal” because it was the people who only chose
liberal. All the people who chose only progressive were labeled “Progressive”. Another category, called
“Prog & Lib”, was all the people who chose both progressive and liberal. Any response which chose
something else was called “Other”.
Measurement – Dependent Variables
The quantitative study of antisemitism has mostly been conducted through cross-sectional
questions by non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and research institutes (Hudson Institute
2019, American Jewish Committee 2020, Anti-Defamation League 2020). The Anti-Defamation
League has conducted an annual survey measuringantisemitic attitudes in both the US and around the
world since 1964. Part of their survey gives respondents a list of antisemitic tropes and asks the
respondents whether they agree or disagree with them. In order to improve the comparability, the
wording in my survey was taken directly from the ADL Global 100 survey.
However, I had to remove a few statements in order to save space on the survey. I chose to drop
the statements for several reasons. For example, the ADL Global 100 survey included the two
statements:
1. Jews have too much power in the business world
2. Jews have too much power in international  nancial markets
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Given the similarity between the two statements there could be an arti cial increase in the number of
antisemitic tropes agreed with as it is likely that support for one statement leads to support for the
other statement. As such I chose to keep the more broad statement about power in the business world.
I also removed the statement about the Holocaust as that is included separately in an experiment. The
statement about world wars was also removed as it plays on the idea of control over global a airs. The
last statement to be removed was about how Jews behave. Finally, I added in a statement about Jews
killing Jesus as this has served as an excuse to attack Jews throughout history. The  nal list of
statements used was:
1.  Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country
2.  Jews have too much power in the business world
3.  Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind
4.  Jews have too much control over global a airs
5.  Jews have too much control over the United States government
6.  Jews think they are better than other people
7.  Jews have too much control over the global media
8.  Jews killed Jesus
Each respondent was then given two options to choose from: “Mostly true” or “Mostly false”. These
two options were also taken from the ADL 100 survey as this is how they coded the people’s responses.
Once all the responses were collected, I looked at which statements had the highest levels of agreement
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as well as how many tropes people agreed with.1 I then analyzed the di erences among the four
ideological groups.
Research Design – Two Experiments
It is important to note that some people may not agree with any of the statements listed above
due to social desirability pressures. Given the relative absence of research designed to uncover latent
antisemitism, there is not an agreed upon list of statements, questions, or even methods to use to
determine its existence. Because of this I created my own experiment designed to uncover latent
antisemitism or at least see if people harbor inherent biases against Jewish people. In each, the idea was
to pose a general principle and then assess whether people would support its application if Jewish
people were mentioned. By varying the group that is mentioned, I am employing a speci c type of
experiment that has been commonly used to determine attitudes towards out-groups (for a review, see
Djupe and Smith 2019).
The  rst experiment asked how much people agree with a statement about  ghting
discrimination. Half of the respondents received one statement, and half received the other statement:
1.  Should the government be doing more  ght discrimination against all groups?
2.  Should the government be doing more to  ght discrimination, like antisemitism?
The  rst statement was designed to act as the control statement. The respondents were then given the
options “Yes”, “No”, or “I don’t know”. The topic of  ghting discrimination was designed to
determine whether a double standard towards antisemitism exists, and thus people harbor latent
1 Check Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix for more details.
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antisemitism. If more people say “Yes” to the  rst statement than the second statement, then that
would signal that a double standard does exist.
The second experiment asked the respondents about their support for people’s right to
national self-determination. The following statements were randomly divided equally among the
participants2:
1.  All people should have the right to self-determination to form their own government or
nation.
2.  Jewish people should have the right to self-determination to form their own government or
nation.
3.  Jewish people should have the right to self-determination to form their own nation and
government – Israel.
Each participant was given the options “Strongly agree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Neither agree nor
disagree”, “Somewhat disagree”, and “Strongly disagree”. I chose to focus on self-determination for
several reasons. First, the UN has claimed that “the right to self-determination [is] integral to basic
human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN 2009). Second, this is designed to measure opposition
to Zionism without explicitly mentioning it. Anti-Zionism has become such an important element
among liberals and progressives that it is not just a political stance, but rather, a “cultural subcode”
(Arnold 2015). Since I am trying to compare how people view Jewish people compared to others, I did
not want the word “Zionism” to serve as a primer for the respondents. The statement without Israel
2 It should be noted that the experiments were appropriately randomized, see Table A1 in Appendix for more details.
However, due to the small sample size for this group, the overt antisemitism levels varied among the respondents for each
statement. Check Figures A3 and A4 for more information. Nevertheless, to solve this issue, I included it in my model and
then checked for interactions with it.
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serves to measure strictly anti-Jewish sentiment (in comparison with scores in the control condition),
while the statement that includes Israel is designed to measure anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiment.
Results – Overt Antisemitism
Before diving into the results of the experiments, we should look at the levels of overt
antisemitism among the various ideological groups tested. Looking at Figure 1.1, we can see the overt
antisemitism levels of each ideology. The  gure shows the average number of statements (tropes) that
each ideology agreed to. The Alt-Right has the highest average with 4.23 and Libertarians have the
second highest with 3.35. Moreover, the di erence between the two is statistically signi cant which
suggests that Alt-Right are more overtly antisemitic than any of the other ideologies. Socialists have the
lowest average with 1.57 tropes, followed by Moderates at 2.11 tropes and the di erence between these
two groups is also statistically signi cant which suggests that Socialists are the least overtly antisemitic
ideological group.
Next are Liberals with 2.29, Progressives with 2.75, and people identify as both Progressive and
Liberal with 2.83 (referred to as ProgLibs), but the di erences between these three groups is not
statistically signi cant. Similarly, even though they have higher mean scores, Conservatives and
Libertarians are not statistically signi cantly higher than Progressives and ProgLibs. Because of this, we
can not conclude that Progressives and ProgLibs hold signi cantly less overt antisemitic sentiment
than Conservatives and Libertarians. On the other hand, the di erence between Liberals and
Conservatives is statistically signi cant which suggests that we can conclude that Liberals have less
overt antisemitism than Conservatives, Libertarians, and the Alt-Right. These results are important
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because they demonstrate that Left-leaning groups harbor some antisemitic sentiment which could
a ect their responses to the experiment. It is necessary to take this into account when analyzing the
results of the experiment to determine if the results are demonstrative of latent antisemitism or simply
the result of overt antisemitism.
Figure 1.1 – Average Overt Antisemitism Score Broken Down by Ideology
Experiment One – Fighting Discrimination
In this experiment each respondent was given one of two questions which started as “Should
government be doing more to  ght discrimination…” One version ended the question by adding in
“...such as antisemitism” at the end, while the other statement simply said “against all groups.” The
respondents were then given three responses “Yes”, “No”, or “I don’t know” which I simpli ed by
combining the “No” and “I don’t know” statements. I also added con dence intervals which are
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equivalent to a 90% test of statistical signi cance when two of them are compared. For the sample as a
whole, the experiment did not have an e ect as both statements received roughly 61% of respondents
agreeing the government should do more to  ght discrimination.3
We can see in Figure 2.1 that for Liberals, Progressives, Proglibs, and Others, there is a small
decrease in support for  ghting discrimination when going from the “Control” statement to the
“Antisemitism” statement, but none of the di erences are statistically signi cant. These results are
counter to my earlier prediction that  ghting discrimination would receive less support if antisemitism
was mentioned. Nevertheless, it should still be noted that the level of support for each statement varies
by group. Liberals have the lowest support levels for both statements with an average of 74.75%
between the two statements, Progressives are slightly higher with 76.55%, and proglibs have the highest
with 90.7%.4 Moreover, each of these groups are signi cantly higher than the other ideologies who
averaged 54.6% support. This shows that left-leaning groups are more supportive of  ghting
discrimination than more centrist or right-wing ideologies.
Figure 2.1 — The Percentage of Respondents Across Ideologlical Groups Who Agree With Each
Statement in the Fighting Discrimination Experiment
4 It should be noted that these models do not include the weight variable as the experiment was randomized without the
weights. Moreover, the results do not change when controls are added for age, gender, partisanship, religion, and race.
3 For the results of the sample as a whole view Figure A5 in the Appendix.
24
Perhaps overt antisemitism can help explain what is causing this lack of a di erence. Figure 2.2
demonstrates the e ect that overt antisemitism has on the response to the treatments in the  ghting
discrimination experiment. Overt antisemitism has no statistically signi cant relationship with support
for  ghting discrimination among any of the ideological groups for the control statement, which makes
sense since nothing Jewish is mentioned to trigger their antisemitism. There is also no relationship for
the “Antisemitism” statement, which only shows a statistically signi cant e ect of overt antisemitism
among ProgLibs (and only at the very highest levels of antisemitism, where very few respondents lie).
This suggests that overt antisemitism does not have a relationship with either statement in the
experiment.
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Figure 2.2 — The Interactive E ect of Overt Antisemitism on Fighting Discrimination
Despite this lack of a relationship, overt antisemitism does a ect how people respond to the
treatment relative to the control. Figure 2.3 shows the “marginal e ects” of the experiment across levels
of overt antisemitism for each ideological group. Marginal e ects show how the response to the
treatment varies from the response in the control condition. We can see that signi cant gaps appear
between the two statements at higher levels of overt antisemitism among Liberals, Progressives, and
ProgLibs. Negative numbers demonstrate that the “Control” statement received more support than
the “Antisemitism” statement, as expected. Therefore, for each of the left-leaning groups, the more
overtly antisemitic someone is, the less likely they are to support  ghting discrimination when
antisemitism is mentioned relative to when it is not mentioned. This suggests that even if there were a
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drop-o  in Figure 2.1, it would likely be caused by overt antisemitism and not necessarily latent
antisemitism.
Figure 2.3 — Marginal E ects of Overt Antisemitism on Support for “Antisemitism” Statement
Compared to “Control” Statement.
Experiment Two – Self-Determination
In this experiment, the respondents were given one of three statements about
self-determination. The purpose of this experiment is to determine if the mention of Jews or Israel
causes a change in people’s support for one’s right to self-determination. In order to view the results
more easily, I simpli ed the “Strongly Agree” and “Somewhat Agree” responses into “Agree”. All other
responses were also simpli ed to “Disagree”. Just like with the  rst experiment, I added con dence
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intervals which are equivalent to a 90% test of statistical signi cance when two of them are compared.
In the sample as a whole, there is a drop in support to the “Jews” statement from the “All People”
statement that is statistically signi cant, but no drop o  appears for the “Jews + Israel” statement.5
We can see the results of the self-determination experiment below in Figure 3.1. Given the
anti-Zionist rhetoric among some people on the Left, some of these results are a bit of a surprise. Some
people have made the argument that Progressives, and others on the Left, use their anti-Zionism to
hide their antisemitic sentiment. Using this logic, I expected to see a drop o  for both statements that
included Israel. Turns out this is not the case for any of the left-leaning groups.
For people who self-identify only as Progressive, there is a 23.6% drop in support from the “All
People” statement (70.8%) to the “Jews + Israel” statement (46.4), which is statistically signi cant.
However, there is actually a 10% increase between the “All people” statement (70.8%) and the “Jews”
statement (80%), though this di erence is not statistically signi cant. This suggests that the Israel
prime worked successfully, as it triggered less support. Moreover, it shows that much of the anti-Israel
and anti-Zionist rhetoric is attached to Israel and not necessarily to the Jewish people. This is
consistent with what I expected. However, I did not expect the “Jews” statement to receive so much
support as I thought that a good portion of the anti-Zionist rhetoric was thinly veiled anti-Jewish
rhetoric.
For people who only self-identify as Liberal, it is a di erent story. First, the overall support for
the statements is signi cantly lower than for Progressives. Secondly, the “Jews” statement received the
least support with only 42.4% of respondents agreeing with it, next was the “All people” statement
5 To see the results of this experiment for the sample as a whole see Figure A6 in the Appendix.
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which received 54%, and then the “Jews + Israel” statement received the most support with 57.9%. The
di erence between the “All people” statement and the “Jews” statement was statistically signi cant.
This shows that, for Liberals, the issue is not with Israel but with Jews themselves. Moreover, the fact
that the support di erential between the “Jews + Israel” statement and the “Jews” statement was also
statistically signi cant suggests that Liberals are supportive of Israel’s right to exist, unlike Progressives.
In other words, Progressives and Liberals appear to have very di erent views of both Jews and Israel.
Where Progressives support Jews but oppose Israel, Liberals oppose Jews and support Israel.
Liberals’ results are very similar to those of the other ideologies. In fact, the percentage that
agreed with the “All People” statement and the “Jews + Israel” statement are within one percentage
point of each other. Similarly, just like with Liberals, there is a drop o  in support for the other
ideologies for the “Jews” statement. However, fewer Liberals agree with the “Jews” statement than
people from other ideologies.
For the  nal left-leaning group, ProgLibs, the overall level of support was more similar to that
of people who only identify as Liberal, except for the “Jews + Israel” statement which received the most
support with 76.9% respondents agreeing to it. The “Jews” statement received less support with 50%,
and the “All people” statement received the least with 47.4%. Since the con dence intervals for the
“Jews + Israel” statement and “All people” statement do not overlap, the di erence is statistically
signi cant. This pattern suggests that ProgLibs are likely pluralists who support the “Jews + Israel”
statement not because of the self-determination portion of the statement, but because of the fact that
Israel is an established country that has existed for decades.
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Figure 3.1 — The Percentage of Respondents Who Agree to Each Statement in the
Self-Determination Experiment
Turning our attention to Figure 3.2, we can see the e ects that overt antisemitism has on
support for the self-determination statements. For Liberals, although agreement with each statement
increases as overt antisemitism increases, only the “Jews” statement has a statistically signi cant
relationship with the tropes. This suggests that overt antisemitism has a signi cant relationship with
the “Jews” statement but none of the others. Unfortunately, the fact that the response to each
statement is so similar suggests that overt antisemitism is not responsible for the drop o  in support for
the “Jews” statement visible in Figure 3.1. More importantly, overt antisemitism is actually linked to an
increase in support for self-determination. For Progressives, the only statement with a relationship
with overt antisemitism was the “All People” statement. This means that Progressives’ overt
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antisemitism has no e ect on their views of Jews’ right to self-determination, with or without the
mention of Israel. For ProgLibs, the only statement that has a statistically signi cant relationship with
overt antisemitism is the “All People” statement. While the “Jews + Israel” statement is close, it is not
quite statistically signi cant.
Figure 3.2 — The Interactive E ect of Overt Antisemitism on Each Statement in the
Self-Determination Experiment
While Figure 3.2 was helpful in understanding how overt antisemitism is related to the
responses in Figure 3.1, the results depicted in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate the di erence in the
responses of the experiment statements (“Jews” and “Jews + Israel”) and the control statement (“All
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People”) for each number of tropes agreed with. In other words, we can see how overt antisemitism
a ects the response to the treatment statements in relation to the control statement response.
Figure 3.3 demonstrates how support for the “All People” statement and the “Jews” statement
di ers as overt antisemitism increases. Both Progressives and Liberals have statistically signi cant gaps
that demonstrate the relationship overt antisemitism has with decreasing support for the “Jews”
statement relative to the “All People” statement. Yet, the treatment e ects occur at opposite levels of
overt antisemitism as the gap for Progressives appears at medium to high levels of overt antisemitism
(5-8 tropes) while for Liberals it appears at low to medium levels (0-5 tropes). This indicates that there
are no treatment e ects at high levels of overt antisemitism among Liberals. At the same time, there are
treatment e ects at low levels of overt antisemitism that decrease support for the “Jews” statement
relative to the “All People” statement. This suggests that the drop o  in Figure 3.1 is not caused by
overt antisemitism. For Progressives, low levels of overt antisemitism (0-1 tropes) show treatment
e ects increasing support for the “Jews” statement relative to the “All People” statement. However, it
 ips at higher levels (5-8 tropes)  –  the treatment e ects cause a decrease in support for the “Jews”
statement relative to the “All People” statement. For ProgLibs we see di erent treatment e ects. Low to
medium levels of overt antisemitism (1-5 tropes) increases support for the “Jews” statement relative to
the “All People” statement. In short, the e ects of overt antisemitism on the “Jews” statement relative
to the “All People” statement are very di erent among the three groups. While there are a variety of
di erent possible explanations, I would hypothesize that this is the result of di ering levels of Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO). Higher levels of SDO would likely lead to less support for
self-determination, especially with a group that is deemed as inferior, in this case Jews. Moreover, it is
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possible that SDO plays a greater role than overt antisemitism in determining support for each
statement in the experiment.
Figure 3.3 — Marginal E ects of Overt Antisemitism on Support for “Jews” Statement Compared to
“All People” Statement Across Ideology and Tropes
Similar to Figure 3.3, in Figure 3.4 we can see how overt antisemitism a ects support for the
“Jews+Israel” statement relative to the “All People” statement. It is clear that the treatment e ects do
not vary across overt antisemitism levels among Liberals and ProgLibs. Nevertheless, among
Progressives there are treatment e ects across all trope levels except among the very lowest (0-1 tropes).
This indicates that the treatment e ects are causing a decrease in support for the “Jews+Israel”
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statement relative to the “All People” statement among all levels of overt antisemitism except for the
lowest levels.
Figure 3.4 — Marginal E ects of Overt Antisemitism on Support for “Jews+Israel” Statement
Compared to “All People” Statement Across Ideology and Tropes
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 help explain the gaps between the “Jews” statement and “All People” as well
as the gaps between the “Jews+Israel” and “All People” statements, but it fails to explain the di erence
between the “Jews” statement and the “Jews+Israel” statements. Looking at Figure 3.5 we can see the
same story where Progressives and Liberals appear to be opposites. While both groups have statistically
signi cant treatment e ects among those who agree with zero to four tropes, they are on opposite sides
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of the vertical line. This means that, among Progressives, low levels of overt antisemitism have a
signi cant e ect on decreasing support for the “Jews+Israel” statement relative to the “Jews”
statement. For Liberals it is  ipped, with low levels of overt antisemitism increasing support for the
“Jews+Israel” statement relative to the “Jews” statement. For ProgLibs, we see the same thing as
Progressives, except for those with zero tropes. More importantly, across each ideology, high levels of
overt antisemitism (5-8 tropes) show no statistically signi cant treatment e ects on support for one
statement relative to the other. All of this suggests that the di erences in support for Jews’ right to
self-determination that appear when Israel is mentioned vs when it is not, are not the result of overt
antisemitism but rather of something else. I would speculate that this is caused by the predominantly
negative rhetoric used towards Israel and Zionism more generally among Progressives. As Sina Arnold
mentioned, being anti-Zionist and anti-Israel has become so engrained in the Left that it has become a
“subcultural code” of sorts. Given this, it is not surprising to see that Progressives’ support for Jews’
right to self-determination drops when Israel.
Figure 3.5 — Marginal E ects of Overt Antisemitism on Support for “Jews+Israel” Statement
Relative to “Jews” Statement Across Ideology and Tropes
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Conclusion
When I heard the antisemitic comments made by DeSean Jackson, Stephen Jackson, and Ice
Cube, I began to wonder if these were isolated incidents or representative of something more
widespread. Moreover, given the frequent downplay and denial of antisemitism as well the anti-Zionist
and anti-Israel rhetoric among the Left, it is surprising that there has not been much research
conducted to investigate this phenomena to understand it better. In addition, there has been a lack of
research attempting to investigate latent antisemitism (though see ...Berinsky and Mendelberg and
others). This paper attempted to  ll this gap in literature through the use of two experiments that
would elicit latent antisemitism as well as cross-sectional questions designed to measure overt
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antisemitism. Furthermore, I focused on three di erent groups among the Left: Progressives, Liberals,
and ProgLibs (people who identi ed as both Progressive and Liberal).
While many people who identify with the labels Progressive or Liberal believe that they oppose
all forms of hatred, the results to the overt antisemitism questions paint a di erent picture. Despite
having lower mean scores, Progressives and ProgLibs are not statistically signi cantly lower than
Conservatives and Libertarians. This suggests that the overt antisemitism levels of Progressives and
ProgLibs are not statistically distinguishable from Conservatives and Libertarians. Liberals on the
other hand have statistically lower levels of antisemitism than Conservatives, Libertarians, and the
Alt-Right. Nevertheless, the three left-leaning groups have lower levels of overt antisemitism than
right-leaning groups (Conservatives, Libertarians, and the Alt-Right).
Furthermore, the results in the  rst experiment do not show any evidence of a double standard
applied towards antisemitism as one form of discrimination that would potentially indicate latent
antisemitism. However, even if a gap were to appear, it would likely be caused by overt antisemitism as
people with high levels of overt antisemitism showed signi cantly less support for the “Antisemitism”
statement than the “Control” statement. Interestingly, since no gap did appear, these results suggest
that overt antisemitism does not have a big enough impact on  ghting discrimination to cause a gap in
the responses. Alternatively, it is entirely possible that people hold overtly antisemitic sentiment and
still hold positive views towards Jews. Since the overt antisemitism questions did not explicitly ask
people how they felt towards Jews, it is possible that many Progressives, Liberals, and ProgLibs who do
have overt antisemitism still have positive views of Jews and thus still support the  ght against
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antisemitism. Alternatively, it is possible that these people felt enough social desirability pressure to
hide their true feelings and opinions.
The second experiment was much less straightforward. Generally, it showed that there is no
standard response among left-leaning groups. Progressives are supportive of Jews and their right to
self-determination, so long as it is not in Israel. Liberals, on the other hand, are supportive of Israel but
not of Jews as they support people’s right to self-determination except when it comes to Jews, unless
Israel is mentioned. ProgLibs are against the idea of self-determination but are supportive of Israel’s
right to exist. Furthermore, Liberals' lack of support for Jews’ right to self-determination is not a result
of overt antisemitism but rather of something else. This is indicative of latent antisemitism, as it relates
to self-determination among Liberals. While Progressives are supportive of Jews’ and their right to
self-determination they do not support Israel’s right to exist, which is antisemitic itself. This drop o 
does not exist at high levels of overt antisemitism. This suggests that Progressives' lack of support for
Israel’s right to exist is not based on overt antisemitism.
Like other forms of hatred and prejudice, antisemitism is a problem that needs to be properly
addressed. However, that can not happen unless it is understood better. Much of the recent research
has looked at how widespread overt antisemitism is, but not much of it looks at how rampant latent
antisemitism is. The research here shows that while latent antisemitism may not appear when looking
at  ghting against discrimination, it does show up when self-determination is mentioned. These
 ndings are important as they help us understand more of the anti-Zionism of the Left. Nevertheless,
more needs to be done to better understand what is driving the results of these experiments and what
other conditions cause latent antisemitism to appear.
38
References
Ad Fontes Media. “Vox Bias and Reliability.” Last modi ed April 5, 2021.
https://www.adfontesmedia.com/vox-bias-and-reliability/.
Altemeyer, Bob. 1996. The Authoritarian Spectre. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Harvard University
Press.
AllSides. “Vox.” Accessed April 22, 2021. https://www.allsides.com/news-source/vox-news-media-bias.
American Jewish Committee. n.d. “The State of Antisemitism in America 2020: AJC's Survey of the
General Public.” Accessed April 22, 2020.
https://www.ajc.org/AntisemitismReport2020/Survey-of-the-General-Public.
Anti-Defamation League. n.d. “Zionism.” Glossary Terms. Accessed March 3, 2021.
https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/zionism.
Anti-Defamation League. 2020. “Anti-Semitic Stereotypes Persist in America, Survey Shows.”
Antisemitism in the US, January 29, 2020.
https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/anti-semitic-stereotypes-persist-in-america-survey-sho
ws.
Antoniou, Georgios, Elias Dinas, and Spyros Kosmidis. 2020. “Collective Victimhood and Social
Prejudice: A Post-Holocaust Theory of Anti-Semitism.” Political Psychology 41, no. 5
(October 2020): 861-886. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12654.
Arnold, Sina. 2015. “From Occupation to Occupy: Antisemitism and the Contemporary Left in the
United States.” In Deciphering the New Antisemitism, edited by Alvin H. Rosenfeld, 375-404.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt18crxz7.17.
Bieler, Des. 2020. “Stephen Jackson says DeSean Jackson is ‘speaking the truth,’ adds anti-Semitic
claims of his own.” Washington Post, July 8, 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2020/07/08/stephen-jackson-says-desean-jackson-is
-speaking-truth-adds-anti-semitic-claims-his-own/.
Chomsky, Noam. N.d. “Anti-Semitism, Zionism, and the Palestinians.” Variant #16.
https://romulusstudio.com/variant/16texts/Chomsky.html; transcription of an October 11,
2002 talk.
Cooperman, Alan. “A Portrait of American Jews.” Pew Research Center, October 1, 2013.
https://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/jewish-american-beliefs-attitudes-culture-survey/.
Cunningham, William A., John B. Nezlek, and Mahzarin R. Banaji. “Implicit and Explicit
Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the Ideologies of Prejudice.” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 30, no. 10 (October 2004): 1332–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204264654.
Davidson, Lawrence. 2016. “On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism.” CounterPunch, May 12, 2016.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2016/05/12/82580/.
39
Davidson, Lawrence. 2021. “Defending Apartheid.” CounterPunch, January 12, 2021.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2021/01/12/defending-apartheid/.
Djupe, Paul A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2019. “Experimentation in the Study of Religion and Politics.”
In Oxford Encyclopedia of Politics & Religion, edited by Paul A. Djupe, Mark J. Rozell, and Ted
G. Jelen. New York: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.990.
Dunbar, Edward and Lucie Simonova. 2003. “Individual di erence and social status predictors of
anti-Semitism and racism US and Czech  ndings with the prejudice/tolerance and right wing
authoritarianism scale.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 27, no. 5 (September
2003): 507-523. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767(03)00051-8.
Frindte, Wolfgang, Susan Wettig, and Dorit Wammetsberger. 2005. “Old and New Anti-Semitic
Attitudesin the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation—Two
Studies in Germany.” Peace and Con ict: Journal of Peace Psychology 11, no. 7: 239-266.
Green, Emma. 2017. “Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed With Jews: Anti-Semitic logic
fueled the violence over the weekend, no matter what the president says.” The Atlantic, August
15, 2017.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/nazis-racism-charlottesville/536928/.
Greenspan, Rachel E.. 2020. “Ice Cube is posting anti-Semitic memes and conspiracy theories on
Twitter.” Insider, June 12, 2020.
https://www.insider.com/ice-cube-shares-anti-semitic-conspiracy-theories-on-twitter-2020-6.
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo. 2019.
Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20: Tracking sustainable peace through inclusion, justice,
and security for women. Washington, DC: GIWPS and PRIO.
Hudson Institute. 2019. “National Survey: Anti-Semitism In America.” Accessed April 22, 2020.
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/National%20Anti-Semitism%20Survey_Public
_Crosstabs.pdf.
Imho , Roland, and Rainer Banse. “Ongoing Victim Su ering Increases Prejudice: The Case of
Secondary Anti-Semitism.” Psychological Science 20, no. 12 (December 2009): 1443–47.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02457.x.
Jacobson, William A.. 2016. “Oberlin College Alums: Anti-Israel fanaticism creating hostile
environment for Jews.” Legal Insurrection, January 17, 2016.
https://legalinsurrection.com/2016/01/oberlin-college-alums-anti-israel-fanaticism-creating-h
ostile-environment-for-jews/.
Kane, James G., Stephen C. Craig, Kenneth D. Wald. 2005. “Religion and Presidential Politics in
Florida: A List Experiment.” Social Science Quarterly 85, no. 2 (June): 281-293.
40
Kofta, Mirosław, Wiktor Soral, and Michał Bilewicz. 2020. “What Breeds Conspiracy Antisemitism?
The Role of Political Uncontrollability and Uncertainty in the Belief in Jewish Conspiracy.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 118, no. 5:
900-918. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000183. .
Lind, Dara. 2017. “Unite the Right, the violent white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, explained.”
Vox, August 14, 2020.
https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138246/charlottesville-nazi-rally-right-uva.
Massad, Joseph. 2019. “The core of Zionism is settler-colonialism, not democracy.” Interview by
Nasim Ahmed. Middle East Memo, June 18, 2019.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190618-the-core-of-zionism-is-settler-colonialism-not
-democracy/.
Media Bias Fact Check. “Vox.” Last modi ed March 10, 2021. https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/vox/.
Michael Love, Aaron. 2002. “Israel and white Supremacy.” CounterPunch, October 15, 2002.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2002/10/15/israel-and-white-supremacy/.




Nadi, Selim. 2020. “No, You Won’t Smear Our Fight Against Israeli Apartheid as “Antisemitic”.”
Jacobin, June 21, 2020.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/israel-france-palestine-activists-echr-antisemitism.
Neubeck, Kyle. 2020. “DeSean Jackson shares anti-semitic quotes attributed to Hitler on Instagram.”
The Philly Voice, July 7, 2020.
https://www.phillyvoice.com/eagles-desean-jackson-anti-semitic-instagram-farrakhan-hitler-qu
otes/.
Newport, Frank. 2019. “American Jews, Politics and Israel.” Gallup, August 27, 2019.
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/265898/american-jews-politics-israel.aspx.
Pink, Aiden. 2019. “40% Of Germans Think Jews Talk About The Holocaust Too Much.” Forward,
October 25, 2019.
https://forward.com/fast-forward/433734/germany-jews-holocaust-anti-semitism/.
Pratto, Felicia, James Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle. 1994. “Social dominance
orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 67, no. 4: 741-763.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741.
Raden, David. 1999. “Is Anti-Semitism Currently Part of an Authoritarian Attitude Syndrome?”
Political Psychology 20, no. 2 (June 1999): 323-343. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3792079.
41
Rosenberg, Steve. 2020. “Two years since Tree of Life shooting, anti-Semitism persists in politics.” The
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27, 2020.
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/tree-of-life-synagogue-shooting-anniversary-
anti-semitism-20201027.html.
Rudman, Laurie, Anthony G. Greenwald, Deborah S. Mellott, and Jordan L. K. Schwartz. 1999.
“Measuring the Automatic Components of Prejudice: Flexibility and Generality of the
Implicit Association Test.” Social Cognition 17, no. 4 (December): 437-465.
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1999.17.4.437.




Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. 1999. “Social Dominance Theory: A New Synthesis.” In Social
Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression, 31–58. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175043.002.
Schwartz, Alexandra. 2018. “The Tree of Life Shooting and the Return of Anti-Semitism to American
Life.” The New Yorker, October 27, 2018.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-tree-of-life-shooting-and-the-return-of
-anti-semitism-to-american-life.
Shire, Emily. 2017. “Does Feminism Have Room for Zionists?” The New York Times, March 7, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/opinion/does-feminism-have-room-for-zionists.html?
_r=0.
Smith, Tom W., and Benjamin Shapiro. 2019. “Antisemitism in Contemporary America.” In American
Jewish Year Book 2018, edited by Arnold Dashefsky and Ira Sheskin, vol 118. Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03907-3_3.
Sunshine, Spencer. 2019. “Looking Left at Antisemitism.” Journal of Social Justice 9: 1-67.
http://transformativestudies.org/wp-content/uploads/Spencer-Sunshine.pdf.









Appendix – Modern Antisemitism in Progressive Circles
Variable Coding
Dependent Variables
Support for self -determination – An index (collapsed to a 0-1 scale) that measures support for each
statement in an experiment about certain groups’ right to self-determination to form their own
government or state. Each was originally coded 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree.
Support for  ghting discrimination – An index (collapsed to a 0-1 scale) that measures support for
each statement in an experiment about the the government doing more to  ght discrimination
respondents were given one of two statements that asserted that asked whether the government
should do more to  ght against discrimination. Each response was coded 0= “No”, 1= “I Don’t
Know”, and 2 = “Yes”.
Independent Variables
Self -determination experiment – Variables were “All People”, “Jews”, and “Jews + Israel”. Full
statements for each variable can be found in Research Design section.
Fighting discrimination experiment – Variables were “Control” and “Antisemitism”. Full
statements for each variable can be found in Research Design section.
Partisanship – “Generally, which of these party labels bests describes you?” Collapsed to Democrat =
Strong Democrat, Democrat, or Independent but lean Democrat; Independent = Independent (no
leaners); Republican=Strong Republican, Republican, or Independent but lean Republican.
White – Identi es as White=1, 0=otherwise.
Age – In years (18 or over)
Gender – 1=Women, 0=Men.
Education – “What is the highest level of education that you have completed?” 1= Less than High
School, 2=High School or GED, 3=Some college or trade school, 4=4-year college graduate,
5=Graduate education (toward a master's or doctoral degree)
Ideology – “Which of these labels best describes you and your general political views? Choose as many
as apply.” The choices listed were: Conservative, Alt-Right, Moderate, Liberal, Progressive,
Libertarian, or Socialist. Grouping of the ideologies can be found in Research Design section.
Overt antisemitism – An index of overt antisemitism summed up from eight statements described in
the Research Design section. Coded as 1= Mostly agree; 0= “Mostly disagree”. Full list of
statements can be found in Research Design Section.
Figure A1 – Overt Antisemitic Sentiment For Each Ideological Group
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Figure A2 – How Each Ideological Group Views Individual Antisemitic Tropes
Figure A3 – Overt Antisemitism Averages for Each Ideology in Fighting Discrimination Experiment
44
Figure A4 – Overt Antisemitism Averages for Each Ideology in Self-Determination Experiment
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Figure A5 – Percentage of Respondents Who Agree With Each Statement in Fighting Discrimination
Experiment
Figure A6 – Percentage of Respondents Who Agree With Each Statement in Self-Determination
Experiment
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Table A1 – ANOVA Tests for Randomization
Experiment Variable Pr(F)
Fighting Discrimination White 0.354
Fighting Discrimination Gender 0.76
Fighting Discrimination Education 0.482






Table A2 – OLS Models for Figure 2.2
Fighting Discrimination Experiment
Intercept 1.26 * (0.04)
Tropes -0.01 (0.91)
Antisemitism Statement 0.03 (0.93)
Progressives -0.44 (0.52)
ProgLibs 1.97 (0.18)
Other -1.42 *** (0.00)
Age 0.01 (0.09)
Gender -0.36 ** (0.00)
Education 0.32 *** (0.00)
White 0.30 * (0.03)
Catholic -1.23 * (0.02)
Evangelical -1.68 ** (0.00)
Jewish -1.19 * (0.05)
Mainline -1.19 * (0.03)
No Religion -1.59 ** (0.00)
Non-Denominational -1.53 ** (0.01)
Other Faith -1.69 ** (0.00)
Unclassi ed -1.55 ** (0.00)
Tropes * Antisemitism Statement -0.10 (0.25)
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Tropes * Progressives 0.17 (0.33)
Tropes * ProgLibs -0.06 (0.87)
Tropes * Other 0.12 (0.08)
Antisemitism Statement * Progressives 0.43 (0.62)
Antisemitism Statement * ProgLibs 0.22 (0.91)
Antisemitism Statement * Other 0.02 (0.95)
Tropes * Antisemitism Statement * Progressives -0.16 (0.49)
Tropes * Antisemitism Statement * ProgLibs -0.25 (0.54)





Table A3 – OLS Models for Figure 3.2
Self-Determination Experiment
Intercept -0.14 (0.79)
Tropes 0.21 * (0.01)
Jews Statement -0.80 * (0.03)
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Gender -0.56 *** (0.00)






No Religion -0.94 * (0.04)
Non-Denominational -0.43 (0.38)
Other Faith -0.69 (0.16)
Unclassi ed -0.91 (0.06)
Tropes * Jews Statement 0.06 (0.62)
Tropes * Jews + Israel Statement -0.07 (0.54)
Tropes * Progressives 0.35 (0.27)
Tropes * ProgLibs 0.07 (0.81)
Tropes * Other -0.02 (0.87)
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Jews Statement * Progressives 2.66 * (0.02)
Jews + Israel Statement * Progressives -0.62 (0.49)
Jews Statement * ProgLibs -0.39 (0.71)
Jews + Israel Statement * ProgLibs -0.85 (0.54)
Jews Statement * Other 0.40 (0.35)
Jews + Israel Statement * Other 0.04 (0.92)
Tropes * Jews Statement * Progressives -0.71 (0.06)
Tropes * Jews + Israel Statement * Progressives -0.29 (0.43)
Tropes * Jews Statement * ProgLibs 14.55 (0.97)
Tropes * Jews + Israel Statement * ProgLibs 0.41 (0.38)
Tropes * Jews Statement * Other -0.01 (0.96)
Tropes * Jews + Israel Statement * Other 0.02 (0.89)
N 1790
AIC 2182.22
BIC 2379.85
Pseudo R2 0.25
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